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Several lines of evidence point to the dream as a mediator of incentive phenomena. 
We review herein evidence from ontogenetic studies of the pleasure reaction, phylo- 
genetic studies of the evolution of intelligence, studies of brain stimulation and 
recording, and clinical observations. These all suggest that it is possible to identify 
an evolutionary specialization of pleasure that (a) has served to mediate cognitive 
phenomena and (b) that the pontine noradrenergic locus coeruleus nucleus and its 
projections may play a role in this mediation. 
‘In everyone resides a certain species of desires, that are terribly savage 
and irregular-and this indeed, becomes manifest in sleep.’ 
PLATO, Dialogues 
‘The dreams of small children are simple wish fulf?llrnents and therefore, 
in contradiction to the dreams of adults, of very little interest. They are 
no puzzles, but are naturally of utmost importance as proof that in its 
core every dream is a wish fuhilhnent.’ 
FREUD, Interpretation of Dreams 
Dreams, by their nature, are continually present reminders of the complexity of 
mental life. All people dream, generally four to six times each night (Jouvet, 1967a, b; 
Dement, 1969; Hartmann, 1973), although memories for sleep experiences are often 
vague and incomplete. Comparative and developmental studies of sleep suggest both 
an onto- and phylogenetic continuity of Rapid Eye Movement (REM) states in 
humans or Paradoxical Sleep (PS) in animals as the physiological concomitant and 
probable cause of dreaming (Kleitman, 1963; Jouvet, 1967a; Snyder, 1969). REM is 
present in human neonates from birth, and is found in all mammals, and in a rudi- 
mentary form in birds. The hypothesis that animals dream in fact precedes modern 
sleep studies by some two millenia (Ba&y, 1921). 
The anatomy, physiology and pharmacology of brain structures determining 
dreaming are well established, and have been reviewed in detail (e.g. Jouvet, 1967a; 
Morgane & Stern, 1974; Hobson & McCarley, 1977). Nonetheless, the purpose of 
the dream-the psychological functions served by it-remains as elusive as dreams 
themselves. Despite thousands of articles upon REM, its functional significance 
remains unknown. It is an answer residing in each of us that leaves us pondering what 
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question it might address. The present paper is intended as a selective review and 
synthesis. Our thesis is that there may be an underlying common ground to many 
apparently discrepant theories of dream function, and that this common ground 
involves pleasure, with dreams serving both incentive maintaining purposes and 
further, as integrators of certain forms of cognition (the latter being based upon the 
former). To establish this we begin with an overview of some major theories of 
dream function. 
While early views of dreaming may be found in the Old Testament (cf. the story 
of Daniel), in Greek and Roman mythology and in alchemical theory, perhaps the 
single most influential attempt to systematize dreams may be found in the psycho- 
analytic theories of Freud and his followers. 
Traditional psychoanalytic views have emphasized functions related to moti- 
vational homeostasis, and the discharge of emotional impulses. 
Of the dream we know as yet only that it expresses a wish fulfillment of the unconscious; and 
apparently the dominant preconscious system permits this fulfillment when it has compelled 
the wish to undergo certain distortions . , . (Freud, 1900). 
Thus for traditional psychoanalytic theory, the dream, through its manifest and latent 
content, is a means to wish fulfilhnent and the resolution and satisfaction of libidinal 
impulses. 
More recent psychoanalytic theories (e.g. Hartmann, 1976; Khan, 1976) and other 
non-analytically oriented views have stressed information processing, learning and 
cognitive accommodation rather than motivational functions. One example of this 
is a study of patients about to enter psychotherapy (Greenberg & Pearlman, 1976). 
Examination of initial sleep parameters prior to the beginning of therapy (i.e. REM 
amount, coherence and efficiency) proved to offer considerable predictive value 
regarding patient accessibility, conflicts and the probability of elopement from 
therapy. A second more recent study also shows reduced REM latency with psycho- 
therapy (Karle, Hopper, Corriere, Hart & Switzer, 1977). The psychological restruc- 
turing of therapy is, of course, one special form of learning. 
Other forms of learning and adaptive functioning also appear to be reflected in 
REM changes. A number of recent reviews (Hennevin & Leconte, 1977; McGrath 
& Cohen, 1978) have stressed consistent increases in REM in both humans and 
animals immediately after learning. It appears that REM is normally increased after 
a variety of learning tasks, particularly when they involve relatively complex modes 
of solution. Conversely, interference with post trial REM selectively retards the 
normal acquisition process. For example, Paul & Dittrichova (1975) report that 
human infants showed increased REM after learning a head turning task. They did 
not show this change, however, after another task which was not acquired. Hennevin 
& Leconte (1977), in their extensive review, discuss a number of experiments in rats 
carried out by their research group. In one typical experiment rats learning an 
avoidance response showed correlated increases in PS, while rats not learning failed 
to show this change. Interference with post trial PS retarded learning, but only if 
administered immediately after the session. Later but equivalent amounts of PS 
deprivation were without effect. These examples indicate some truth to both clinically 
generated and experimental insights upon the nature of PS, and hence dreaming. 
They suggest that dreams are involved with both motivational and cognitive activity. 
We propose a view which is alternative and complementary to both motivational 
and information processing views. Our hypothesis has its roots in recent psycho- 
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analytic theory and physiological evidence. On the one hand, the psychoanalytic 
framework drawing upon the recent theories of Khan (1976) suggests a distinction 
between the dream functions and dream content. Khan argues that the dreaming 
experience influences behavior; however, the dream itself, as dream script or story 
may not necessarily be available, accessible or amenable to analysis. In the present 
paper, we are only incidentally concerned with manifest dream content, the so-called 
‘dream script’. While content may offer some clues to dream function we know of no 
non-anecdotal studies in which dreams have been systematically subjected to content 
analysis for their underlying motivational or affective structure. Such a study would 
require large-scale sampling of normal and psychiatric populations and well-controlled 
statistical procedures. Should such studies occur they might also prove helpful and 
possibly complementary to other approaches. Since they are not available, however, 
the present analysis must restrict itself accordingly. On the other hand, the physio- 
logical evidence necessarily carries with it a number of structural concerns, since 
it suggests that a neural:structure with at best limited plasticity and functions generates 
dream patterns. It might be noted that Hobson & McCarley (1977) have, in fact, 
attempted to deal with possible psychobiological bases of actual dream content in a 
preliminary fashion. Nonetheless, this approach remains tentative and we again stress 
that content and function, i.e. the dream script and dream, may be fruitfully studied 
separately. Also, in light of several excellent reviews which have recently appeared, 
we will limit our discussion of the physiology and clinical neuroanatomy of sleep to 
some rather circumscribed aspects of the brain circuitry controlling REM. 
Our aim is to present and evaluate evidence suggesting that stage REM is a primitive 
pleasure state which has become specialized for the control of cognition. This thesis 
may be broken down into component hypotheses which will be individually treated. 
First, we propose that based upon converging lines of psychobiological evidence, 
stage REM is a pleasure state. Another way of saying this is that we consider the 
brain state in stage REM to be equivalent to that which occurs in normal reinforce- 
ment. Second, we propose that the pleasure state involves circumscribed functions. 
It is involved with the integration of the qualitative and quantitative stimulus aspects 
of reward. We further argue that this capacity to respond selectively to reinforcement 
may mediate certain forms of learning involving the formation of afferent associations 
(i.e. S-S or cognitive learning). This thesis, although not original, since it draws upon 
both motivational and cognitive interpretations, nonetheless offers a novel synthesis 
of neo-Freudian and information processing views of sleep, and suggests a mecha- 
nism by which both theories might ultimately be correct and complementary in their 
view of dreaming. This view also offers psychobiological evidence for the truth of 
certain psychoanalytic propositions. The evidence bearing upon the present thesis 
derives from a number of seemingly unrelated sources which have previously not 
been brought to bear upon this issue in a systematic manner. Included among these 
areas are : developmental psychobiology, comparative studies of learning across species 
and physiologic evidence from brain stimulation. Studies of these topics and their 
relation to REM will be summarized in course, and their relation to the REM- 
pleasure-cognition hypothesis shown. 
The ontogenesis of dreaming 
Any description of the functional significance of sleep and dreaming must take 
account of its ontogenesis and functional concomitants in neonates. Developmental 
studies are both useful and necessary because they permit the study of phenomena in 
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their most elementary form, prior to influences such as learning or maturation. 
Moreover, and for related reasons, grounds exist for expecting closer continuity and 
more readily established functional relationships for neonates and other species than 
for more mature animals. Finally, neonatal studies provide a baseline for comparing 
systematic psychobiological changes over time. Since many changes occur, develop- 
mental studies allow unobtrusive identification of covarying and hence potentially 
interrelated phenomena. 
A number of aspects of neonatal sleep are signal. REM is relatively more frequent in 
neonates and only gradually declines to adult levels. Also, neonatal REM lacks the 
sequential structure of later sleep. While adult REM occurs only after a transition 
from stages four through one, neonatal REM may occur from waking or directly 
from stage four. While the recording and analysis of these changes is somewhat 
problematic-EEG patterns are not as well defined as in adults, these relationships, 
nonetheless, have been upheld in a number of laboratories using both behavioral and 
electrophysiological criteria (Rotfwarg, Dement & Fisher, 1964; Emde Sz Metcalf, 
1970). 
It is of considerable interest that the major behavioral concomitants of REM in 
neonates are signs of pleasure and consummatory behavior. Neonatal REM is 
accompanied by episodic bursts of smiling. Wolff (1959) reported a high correlation 
between smiling and ‘irregular sleep’, and in fact suggested this might represent a 
primitive affective state. Recent longitudinal studies indicated smiling coincident 
with active sleep (REM) as early as 1 day post partum. This has been confirmed 
repeatedly and both brief reflexive and slow well-organized smiles occur at least 2 
weeks prior to the initiation of social behavior and social expression (e.g. Prechtl, 
1974). Independent confirmation of both the ‘endogenous’ (i.e. non-social) nature of 
smiling and its correlation with REM have since been found in several other studies 
(Roffwarg et al., 1964; Tcheng & Laroche, 1965; Petre-Quadens, 1966; Prechtl, 
1974). Edme & Metcalf (1970) noted smiling in neonates which could not be related 
to ‘gas’ as had been hypothesized by others. 
Suckling has also frequently been observed during REM in infants (Nystrom, 
Bandmann & Valentin, 1977). In one recent and extremely thorough categorization 
of neonatal sleep patterns, three clusters of behavior involving crying, smiling and 
startle responses were found to exist which were mathematically independent of each 
other. The second of these three behavioral clusters uniquely included REM, smiling 
and suckling (Nystrom et al., 1977). It would therefore appear that smiling and possibly 
pleasure are ‘endogenous’ to the structure of sleep, and specialized in REM. 
Related findings suggest a high coincidence of PS and pleasure responding in other 
species. For example, grooming and suckling are generally followed by increased PS 
in cats and rats (Jouvet-Mounier, Astic & Lacote, 1970). It has been hypothesized 
that ‘sucking REM’ may be a non-nutritional activity since kittens will suckle con- 
tinuously for several hours in stage REM (Morgane, 1972). 
Finally, additional developmental data suggest a longitudinal relationship of 
REM and pleasure, although smiling is replaced by other responses. Studies of 
infants, children and adults suggest that the later behavioral accompaniments of 
REM include penile erections in males and clitoral enlargement in females. These 
studies are complicated by the tonic motor inhibition accompanying adult REM ; 
however, the findings appear quite robust. One conclusion from these studies is that 
REM is involved in pleasure. At very least the above studies indicate that it is a 
pleasure concomitant. REM may also be involved in the actual control of pleasure. 
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Evidence for this would require either direct manipulation of REM, and subsequent 
changes in pleasure, or direct manipulation of pleasure with changes in REM. Such 
studies are discussed below. The initial pleasure response is oral and facial (smiling) 
but it is replaced by an adult genital response. This observation fits well into classical 
Freudian theory, but changes seem not to be restricted to those predicted by Freud. 
We have already mentioned changes in REM in association with psychotherapy and 
learning. Maturation may involve specialization of pleasure for both cognitively and 
behaviorally circumscribed activities. These studies (and this last hypothesis) receive 
further support from phylogenetic studies of the evolution of intelligence. 
A behavioral analysis of reward 
Just as ontogenetic studies offer the possibility of longitudinal study and correlation 
of psychobiological relationships, so also do phylogenetic studies, although on an 
evolutionary scale. By comparing different species with respect to correlated changes 
in brain and behavior it is again possible to identify unobtrusively possible structural 
correlates for species specific behavioral and motivational adaptations. We have 
hypothesized, based upon neonatal studies, that REM may represent a primitive 
pleasure state. Comparative learning theory has addressed both the phylogenetic 
roots of reward and the evolution of intelligence. Once again correlated changes of 
REM and pleasure are evident. 
These changes in REM and reward can be understood within a framework of 
hedonic heterogeneity which parallels the phylogeny of PS. Reward has often been 
naively assumed to represent an essentially homogeneous set of functions and opera- 
tions across all species. Skinner (1959) speaks of the difliculty of analysis of species 
characteristics from response records. Other proponents of this view include Thorn- 
dike (1911) and Pavlov (1928). If this view of reward is correct then clearly the 
biological roots of pleasure are phylogenetically very old. In fact, however, a number 
of recent empirical studies of reward and punishment suggest this view of reward may 
be naive in a number of ways. One criticism of this view has come from ethologically 
oriented psychologists while a second has come from comparative learning theorists. 
One of the major ‘ethological’ criticisms of the views of Skinner and others has 
come from Seligman (1970) who terms the former a ‘general process’ account. By 
such a view, any stimulus is equally associable with any response in a given organism. 
Seligman points out that while reward clearly has a number of general and species 
independent aspects, it may also have some species specific properties. Based upon 
the ‘ethological drift’ of certain responses towards prototypical and species specific 
consummatory responses (Breland & Breland, 1961), and apparently large stimulus 
dependent differences in the rate of formation of classically conditioned aversive 
responses to poison after the ingestion of a novel food, Seligman has suggested that 
the postulate of arbitrary associability may not be general, Rather, stimuli and 
reinforcers may show ‘belongingness’ or differential *preparedness’ of associability. 
Rozin has recently suggested a similar view of learning, in which animals show unique 
and species specific patterns of response to motivationally significant stimuli which 
often then show a differential ‘accessibility’ for other forms of learning (Rozin & 
Kalat, 1971; Rozin, 1976). If such views as these are correct even in part it implies 
that reward functions are potentially highly specific, and may require careful analysis 
both within and across species, particularly with regard to correlated changes in 
incentive learning and PS. 
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Further evidence for the complexity, heterogeneity and differential accessibility 
of reward across species functions comes from comparative learning theory (e.g. 
Bitterman, 1965, 1975). Using species as a dependent variable of interest and a 
large variety of learning tasks, qualitative and species specific differences in instru- 
mental performance were observed between fish, turtles, pigeons and rats. These 
differences were interpreted as indicating the operation of possibly two distinctive 
reward mechanisms. On the one hand, organisms such as fish and turtles showed a 
single form of learning that might best be described as primitive stimulus-response 
habit formation, a form of reward possibly mediated by drive reduction. On the other 
hand, birds and rats showed an added ability to respond to rewards as incentive 
stimuli. Particular attention to this second form of reward (wide injra) suggests that 
it may be related to PS. 
Looking first at simple habit formation, a variety of experiments have indicated 
that fish and turtles can learn simple operant schedules of behavior but that they 
often fail to respond to shifts in reward magnitude and quality with appropriate 
response shifts, i.e. altered response latencies or rates. In one experiment when 
magnitude of reward was decreased for a fish it failed to alter its behavior. Turtles, 
on the other hand, responded by assuming the response latency and magnitude 
appropriate to an unshifted control (Bitterman, 1969; Pert & Bitterman, 1970). 
Rats and other mammals, however, showed rather different responses to reward shifts. 
Elliott (1928) and Tinklepaugh (1932) examined the effects of altered reward quality 
while Crespi (1942) examined the effects of altered reward quantity upon performance 
(note also more recent studies, e.g. Gonzales & Bitterman, 1969; Eisenberger, Frank & 
Cortis-Park, 1975). In all of these studies an emotional response accompanied the 
shift in reward. This emotional response assumed a number of forms. Monkeys with 
shifted rewards, for example, showed visible agitation (screaming, excitability), and 
in addition reward shifted rats typically showed response decrements not seen in fish 
or turtles. Rather than assuming an appropriate rate of response, rats would perform 
even more slowly than controls once their reward had been shifted to a smaller 
magnitude. This was termed a depression effect. Later increases in reward subsequent 
to an initial response depression caused a converse phenomenon of behavioral elation 
(i.e. responding above both previous and control levels). Thus, rats and other 
mammals appeared to learn about the stimulus properties of rewards and to respond 
emotionally to alterations in these reward stimulus properties in a way fish and turtles 
did not. Table 1 summarizes these findings. 











Rat (PS deprived) 
+ - - 
+ - 
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t Studies based upon Bitterman and collegues (see text). 
While incentive shifts of the sort Crespi described remain a primary difference 
in learning ability at a species level, other related phenomena may also show a similar 
division along identical species lines. For example, the most radical form of incentive 
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shift at both a qualitative and quantitative level clearly involves a change from no 
(i.e. zero level) reward to some tangible quality and quantity of reward. This sort of 
incentive shift known also as latent learning is found in rats (Thistlethwaite, 1951; 
Bitterman, 1975). Finally, rats extinguish more rapidly to large rewards than to small, 
while the reverse is true of fish. This may imply the existence of a Crespi effect in 
extinction (Gonzalez & Bitterman, 1969). 
Reward functions then are far from homogeneous across species. Rather, they 
involve the interaction of at the very least two processes. On the one hand, a rather 
simple and perhaps drive-like reward mechanism appears to exist in apparently all 
vertebrates which have been examined to date. This mechanism mediates simple 
instrumental learning, and simple reward shifts, and may be considered a ‘general 
process’ mechanism. On the other hand, an incentive mechanism, seen in the Crespi 
effect, in certain forms of facilitated extinction, and in cognitive phenomena appears 
to exist selectively in only a few species (rats and possibly birds). This incentive 
mechanism, by allowing increasingly specialized and specific encoding of reward 
permits increasingly complex modes of problem solution and may be considered the 
sort of specialization Rozin has spoken of (Rozin, 1976). This finding of a species 
specific reward mechanism offers one possible approach to a phylogenetic description 
of behavior and its sleep correlates. 
The biology of the dream 
We have seen that learning about reward is a phylogenetically discontinuous event. 
Indeed, while many species show behavioral adaptations to the presence or alteration 
of reward only few appear to respond with emotional, i.e. elated or depressed, patterns 
of response. It is therefore of interest that a close parallel exists phylogenetically 
between the capacity for this latter class of responses to reward on the one hand and 
the sleep stage of paradoxical sleep (PS) on the other. PS has been observed only in 
mammals and in relatively brief episodes in birds (Derbyshire, Rempel, Forbes & 
Lambert, 1936; Kleitman, 1963; Snyder, 1966; Jouvet, 19673; Hartmann, 1973), 
exactly the same species that are behaviorally sensitive to incentive contingencies. 
The biological foundations of paradoxical sleep are still only partly understood but 
it appears that both tonic and phasic aspects of this sleep state are under the inhibitory 
control of the dorsal pontine noradrenergic nucleus, the locus coeruleus (L.C.) or 
A6, nucleus. Recent studies based on unit recordings within the L.C. suggest that 
the nucleus is inactive during PS (e.g. Hobson & McCarley, 1977; Foote, Bloom & 
Schwartz, 1978), while more ventrally located cells of the paramedian reticular 
formation are conversely more active (op. cit.). Thus locus coeruleus activity appears 
to inhibit many aspects of PS. Other aspects of paradoxical sleep (possibly, for 
example, hippocampal theta) may be under the partial control of the giganto-cellular 
tegmental field (Hobson, McCarley & Wyzinski, 1975; McCarley, & Hobson, 1975; 
note, however, Siegel & McGinty, 1977; Vertes, 1977). 
The locus coeruleus has been a site of particular interest to physiologists and 
pharmacologists because of the neurochemically homogeneous nature of its cells and 
because anatomical studies indicate the cells innervate a number of areas (cerebellum, 
hippocampus, broad areas of the cortex and diencephalon) which could control 
many aspects of motivated behavior (Fuxe, Hokfelt & Ungerstedt, 1970; Lindvall & 
Bjorklund, 1974). We have already noted that animals that do not show incentive 
phenomena (Bitterman, 1975) do not show paradoxical sleep (Jouvet, 19676) and 
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that the locus coeruleus may be critically involved in dreaming. The question then 
arises if it might be possible to implicate the locus coeruleus or its associated neuro- 
physiological activity more directly in the control of incentive. In fact, several lines of 
evidence support the hypothesis of a relationship between paradoxical sleep and 
incentive. 
The first line of evidence is based upon the recording of L.C. activity during 
the normal waking activity of primates and other animals. This relatively unobtrusive 
technique has provided evidence for L.C. involvement in sensory encoding related to 
motivation. Recent work from the laboratory of Floyd Bloom (Foote et al., 1978) 
suggests the locus coeruleus responds to all arousing stimuli. However, it quickly 
habituates to motivationally neutral stimuli. On the other hand, it continues to 
respond to appetitive and aversive stimuli, and will show enhanced firing to condi- 
tioned sti.muli paired with the above. Thus, it is an ideal sensory gate for stimuli 
with differential incentive properties. 
A further means of extending the present correlational findings is to examine directly 
the effects of PS manipulations upon incentive mediated learning and performance. 
Several recent studies have suggested that this approach is a useful one in identifying 
a causal relationship between these two variables, and that interference with PS 
produces concomitant changes in uniquely mammalian learning patterns. Such 
changes are highly task specific with cognitive and incentive learning being most 
affected. For example, both latent learning and the related phenomenon of latent 
extinction are disrupted subsequent to PS deprivation. Since the former task involved 
a below normal response pattern while the latter produced supra normal responding 
i.e. two oppositely signed responses, it follows that non-specific activation or depres- 
sion effects cannot readily account for these findings (Pearlman, 1971; Greenberg & 
Pearlman, 1974; Pearlman & Becker, 1974). It might also be noted that other tasks 
that are typically used as species filters, e.g. habit reversal or probability matching, 
also showed a return to phylogenetically more primitive modes of solution after 
selective REM deprivation (Greenberg & Pearlman, 1974). 
Studies on human populations also support this hypothesis; REM deprivation 
selectively interfered with a problem solving task involving creative rather than rote 
solutions. Reports on REM changes with psychotherapy have already been noted. It 
might be concluded that interference with REM produced a loss of incentive related 
activities (Lewin & Glaubman, 1975). 
The recent work of Mason and colleagues in the laboratory of Dr Iversen (Mason 
& Iversen, 1978) should also be noted. Gonzales & Bitterman (1969) posit the incentive 
depression (i.e. Crespi) effect as a major control of extinction in the rat. Rats with 
lesions of the locus coeruleus and dorsal bundle in fact showed enhancement of 
resistance to extinction and behaved in a manner predicted for non-incentive animals 
(Bitterman, 1969). It might be argued that this increased resistance represented a 
failure to encode altered incentive properties that normally control Crespi effect 
associated behavioral depression and facilitate extinction. 
Physiological evidence 
Perhaps even more telling evidence, however, may be found from an examination 
of several recent studies involving electrical stimulation of the central nervous 
system. In the self-stimulation task animals directly self-administer electrical stimula- 
tion to central reward neurons and it may be assumed that at least some of the 
neurons excited by this stimulation are rewarding if the behavior is maintained 
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over time. Studies employing brain stimulated behavior including self-stimulation 
indicate a functional complementarity between brain stimulated reinforcement and 
paradoxical sleep. Interference with paradoxical sleep produces increases in self- 
stimulation rates (i.e. increased hedonic drive) and conversely self-stimulation may 
reduce the need for paradoxical sleep in both normal and paradoxical sleep-deprived 
subjects (Steiner & Ellman, 1972). In fact, while there exists a near universal drive 
to regain paradoxical sleep after deprivation, this is eliminated through self-stimulation 
(Cohen, Edelman, Bowen & Dement, 1972; Steiner & Elhnan, 1972). Thus, it may be 
seen that intracranial reward within the medial forebrain bundle, the brain system 
which incorporates major fiber bundles from the locus coeruleus, appears to be able to 
substitute for paradoxical sleep. 
Anatomical studies further confirm this, since the locus coeruleus which mediates 
some aspects of paradoxical sleep supports very high levels of self-stimulation 
behavior (Crow, Spear & Arbuthnott, 1972; Ritter & Stein, 1973; Ellman, Acker- 
mann, Farber, Mattiace & Steiner, 1974). In fact, rates of between 15,000 and 20,000 
bar-presses per hour have been reported’for locus coeruleus self-stimulation (Elhnan 
et al., 1974). To our knowledge this is the highest rate of operant bar pressing ever 
reported for any reinforcer. Other studies also indicate that the major ascending fiber 
bundles from the noradrenergic locus coeruleus will support robust self-stimulation 
(German & Bowden, 1974; Rolls, 1975 ; Stein, 1968, 1975). Examination of anti- 
dromic electrical activation of the L.C. by brain stimulation reward indicates that 
many brain sites cause L.C. firing in conjunction with self-stimulation (German & 
Fetz, 1976). In the same study occasional L.C. firing was noted in conjunction with 
foods such as raisins or bananas which might be considered incentives. This is also 
consistent with the report of Foote et al. (1978). REM is clearly complex and the 
locus coeruleus is one, but only one, of many control mechanisms for REM. Con- 
versely, there exist many other control mechanisms for brain stimulation (e.g. 
Routtenberg, 1978). Lesions of the L.C. (op. cit.) apparently have only a minor 
effect upon more rostra1 self-stimulation. Since the L.C. is proposed as a mediator of 
one of various forms of reinforcement this is not necessarily contradictory. 
One possible extension of the present hypothesis would suggest that if any non- 
noradrenergic incentive regulating system could be identified then it might also be 
involved in REM. Crow (1976) has suggested that dopamine may be involved in 
incentive-reward. It is therefore of interest that PS deprivation may induce a super 
sensitivity of DA receptors (Tufik, Lindsey & Carlini, 1978). Since direct effects 
of DA agonists upon PS may be difficult to observe (e.g. Loew, Vigouret & Jaton, 
1976) this may be indirectly mediated. We stress the locus coeruleus might be 
directly or indirectly involved in controlling circumscribed aspects of REM that may 
directly include pleasure and subsequently also the control of cognition. 
Clinical evidence 
A number of studies on humans confirm and expand these findings. Increasing 
REM pressure through selected sleep deprivation results in a state of hyperactivity, 
increased sexual drive, increased appetite, irritability, distractability and cognitive 
disruptions (Fisher & Dement, 1963; Agnew, Webb & Williams, 1967; St Laurent, 
1971). Increased hedonic drive and decreased cognition are predicted from the 
present model. Occasionally euphoria and grandiosity are also present, with symptoms 
almost identical with clinical descriptions of manic episodes. Total sleep deprivation 
disturbs the mood of normal individuals, but in patients who suffer from endogenous 
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depression a therapeutically imposed total sleep deprivation seems to cause some 
improvement (Van den Burg & Van den Hoofdakker, 1975). Endogenous depressive 
patients seem also to respond well to selective REM deprivation (Vogel, Thurmond, 
Gibbons, Sloan & Walker, 1975). 
Other clinical studies offer further parallels to animal studies and support the 
present thesis. Greenberg, Maler & Pearlman (1969) have reported the euphoriant 
gas, nitrous oxide, has an effect in humans similar to the reported effects of brain 
stimulation upon PS in rats. In both cases REM rebound was reduced. All subjects 
reported increased pleasurable sensations and mood after the drug and showed reduced 
REM rebound; the only subject to experience dysphoria showed augmented rather 
than reduced REM. In addition, Cartwright et al. (1975) have noted selected decreases 
in REM in subjects showing emotional involvement when recounting dream materials. 
Several studies therefore suggest that the elegant brain stimulation work of Steiner 
and colleagues may have clinically meaningful counterparts. Additional pharmaco- 
logical studies will be reviewed in course. The present studies suggest the existence of 
correlation between a neural system subserving paradoxical sleep on the one hand 
and incentive functions on the other hand. 
While brain stimulation offers one means of artificially activating central pleasure 
mechanisms, other studies in which the brain’s pleasure mechanism is artificially 
activated or depressed also support the present hypothesis. Other agents which 
allow for such an artificial activation are by and large pharmacothymic in nature, 
i.e. stimulant drugs which have a clear hedonically positive aspect that motivates their 
initial use. Such drugs include a wide variety of stimulant euphoriant agents, for 
example, cocaine, amphetamines and possibly morphine. Both human and animal 
studies suggest that just as electrical stimulation may reduce the need for paradoxical 
sleep, so also may the chemically induced pleasure of stimulant drugs. Drugs of 
abuse such as cocaine (Post, Gillin, Wyatt & Goodwin, 1974), methylphenidate and 
amphetamines (Rechtschaffen & Maron, 1964; Baekeland, 1967 ; Shimizu & Himwich, 
1968) all produce decreases in REM sleep and increased latencies to initial REM 
episodes. Morphine and heroin have been reported to have similar effects (Khazan & 
Sawyer, 1964; Kay, Eisenstein & Jasinski, 1968; Lewis, Oswald, Evans, Akindele & 
Tompsett, 1970). Thus, pleasure augmenting agents both electrical and pharmaco- 
logical have been shown to substitute for paradoxical sleep. 
It follows from the present hypothesis that a group of depressant drugs should 
have largely converse pharmacological and neurophysiological effects. Specifically, 
drugs which increase REM should decrease hedonic responsivity, and drugs that are 
known to reduce incentive functions should increase REM. Reserpine has been 
reported to produce a behavioral syndrome which is clinically indistinguishable from 
endogenous depression (Mendels & Frazer, 1974), and this drug in fact increases 
REM sleep (Hartmann, 1966). Moreover, decreased REM latency also typically 
follows reserpine administration. Thus, a variety of studies from several fields all 
suggest a relationship between REM and incentive which may be viewed in essence 
as a functional substitution of one for the other. High pleasure states are associated 
with less REM, and low pleasure states with substantially increased REM. 
Discussion 
The present paper was prompted by a specific and highly circumscribed set of 
concerns: (1) the possible evolutionary significance of the REM state as a psycho- 
biological antecedent to complex learning phenomena, (2) the possible role of PS in 
Biology of dream and motive I51 
hedonic control and (3) the relationship of PS and disrupted hedonic self-regulation. 
In many ways this limited scope allowed a useful categorization of much data. We 
have argued for involvement of the noradrenergic A6 nucleus in the Crespi effect 
and more generally in incentive. Its control of sleep, its electrophysiological con- 
comitants and stimulation studies all suggest a consistent role. We have suggested 
that the existence of Crespi-like effects, particularly extreme cases of the latter (i.e. 
latent learning), are a necessary antecedent for cognitive (i.e. S-S) learning. Finally, 
we have suggested that since PS is a specialized EEG state it is possible to localize 
the above behavioral functions into the discrete CNS areas mediating paradoxical 
sleep. These hypotheses, while novel, have roots in many previous theories. The 
present section will review these briefly. At the turn of the century Freud suggested 
that dreams represented motivational archetypes in which unacceptable impulses 
were symbolically acted out. Thus dreams served a pleasure discharging function, 
and this is quite similar to the current hypothesis. While the present hypothesis 
makes no statement as to the relationship of manifest dream content and motivation, 
it nonetheless shares an overall concern for the role of the dream in motivational 
self-regulation. 
More recent work from several laboratories (notably the work of Pearlman & 
Greenberg, 1970; Hartmann, 1976; Fishbein & Gutwein, 1977) had addressed the 
role of dreams in information processing. Since these theories assume that information 
processing results in altered ability to adapt to environmental conditions, there is 
again some similarity to the present views, although we stress motivational rather 
than informational aspects of the adaptive process. 
Hartmann recently has also offered a chemical theory of the dream as a restorer of 
noradrenergic function (Hartmann, 1973). Several other authors have independently 
arrived at this conclusion (e.g. Vogel, Traub, Ben-Horin 8z Meyers, 1968; Morgane 
& Stern, 1974). The present review suggests that patency of the noradrenergic L.C. is 
specifically related to incentive reward, a conclusion also found in Stein (1968, 1975). 
In a series of papers on the psychopharmacology of reward and schizophrenia he 
and his co-workers have suggested both incentive and possibly cognitive functions 
for the NA bundle which has been also suggested to be involved in PS. Thus, brain 
stimulation studies, psychoanalytic studies and studies of dreaming lead to identical 
concerns and conclusions. The physiological state of REM is a psychobiological 
equivalent to the motivational state of incentive reward. 
Rozin (1976) has suggested that one means of achieving increased psychobiological 
adaptability is through ‘accessing’ of specific and specialized capacities. One form of 
such accessing was seen in studies of comparative behavior. 
The concept of accessing may be useful in summarizing some of the relationships 
of REM, pleasure and cognition which have been outlined. Two related forms of 
accessing may underlie the proposed relationships. On the one hand, REM is initially 
associated with smiling and oral behaviors. REM may represent a primitive pleasure 
state which becomes specialized for incentive discrimination. Incentive discrimination 
allows for finer behavioral accommodations in reward, higher pleasure functions 
(incentive shifts) and, in principle, for sufficiently fine behavioral control for complex 
learning accommodations. These changes may lie at the roots of cognitive phenomena. 
The second and related use of accessing is neurological and involves the locus 
coeruleus. We have pointed out that sleep initially is associated with oral activity. 
The L.C. appears to fire differentially to certain appetitive stimuli. The L.C. may 
encode the differential properties of food incentives. It may in principle be accessed 
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to other stimuli and hence, in time, subserve general incentive related discrimination 
functions. Thus, it may possess at a neural level the requisite sensory capacity for the 
REM related incentive accessing. Motivation, particularly incentive motivation, 
involving fine discriminations of the stimulus properties of reinforcers may be at the 
root of cognition, and may act through a specialized sleep state. 
Clearly, many aspects of dream-incentive relationships await additional empirical 
study. At the very least the hypotheses which have been proposed are testable, and 
capable of generating additional experiments. It is fitting perhaps to realize that the 
core of human experience is bounded by both its days and its nights, and that we are 
products of both light and darkness--our waking hours and our dreams. 
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